Security alert · Critical
Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets hijacked to serve card skimmer and iOS exploits
· 6 minutes read · Centoculus Security Team
Known since · attacks confirmed since
Affected: Optimizely Web Experimentation (snippet delivery); sites that loaded the snippet on 16 November 2026
What happened
On 17 November 2026 at 01:02 UTC, Optimizely published an incident notice. It says an unauthorised party "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" and used it to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. Optimizely says it has fixed the vulnerability, removed the injected code from affected projects, secured affected user accounts and added protections against unauthorised code delivery. The notice does not say how the flaw worked, how many projects were changed, when the fix went in, whether the attacker still has access, or what customers should do.
Sites that use Optimizely Web Experimentation load a script from the vendor, called a snippet. Each time the snippet loads, it runs a custom code field called Project JavaScript. According to Report URI, the attacker added a loader to the Project JavaScript of customer projects. The snippets were still served from cdn.optimizely.com with the vendor's own certificate. Report URI checked 1,611 snippets and found the code in 188 of them, belonging to 178 organisations. It expects the real number to be higher. Some researchers call the campaign OPTIMJACK.
Timeline, according to the researchers (all times UTC, Monday 16 November 2026):
- 04:21: first injection seen.
- 13:43: card skimmer added.
- From about 20:40: mass cleanup.
- 21:52: only one snippet still carried the code.
One organisation's snippet was cleaned and then infected again with a hidden version. According to Report URI, this shows the attacker still had access at that point.
The payload (track.js) did several things:
- Wallet address swapper: it replaced valid crypto wallet addresses with the attacker's in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests.
- Card skimmer: it captured card number, expiry date and CVV when they were submitted through the site's own form fields. It could not read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe, such as Stripe's hosted fields or Adyen's.
- Cookies and screenshots: after swapping an address, it sent visitors' cookies and a screenshot of the page to the attacker. It could not read cookies marked HttpOnly.
- iOS exploit kits: on iPhones and iPads it loaded a further stage with the Coruna and DarkSword exploit kits. Cynet describes what it saw as conditional delivery, not a confirmed takeover of a real device.
According to Report URI, the same actor's injector had also been planted through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts since late the previous week.
Who is affected
This affects operators of websites and web shops that load an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet. That includes sites that serve the snippet from their own domain, because the content comes from the same project. A snippet that is clean now may still have served the malicious code on 16 November. Operators of sites that use Kissmetrics, StorifyMe or Minute Media scripts should also check them.
Cynet notes that a site that delivered the code has not necessarily had its own systems compromised. The code was delivered through Optimizely, not through the web server. Sites that do not use Optimizely Web Experimentation or the scripts named above are not affected by this incident. There is no server software to update.
What to do now
- Find out which of your sites and your customers' sites load an Optimizely Web Experimentation snippet. Search templates, tag managers and self-hosted copies for cdn.optimizely.com.
- In Optimizely, open the Project JavaScript of every project and the custom code of every experiment. Look for
1688360,atob(and any script you did not write. Theatob(search finds the base64-hidden version of the loader. Remove anything you did not add. - Download every snippet you serve, including self-hosted copies. Search it for
1688360,.icuandtrack.js, and note its Last-Modified header. - Review which users, API tokens and integrations can write to your Optimizely account, and rotate their credentials.
- Ask Optimizely which of your project IDs were changed, and when and how.
- Block the indicators listed below. Search proxy, DNS, firewall and CSP report logs for them from 04:21 UTC on 16 November 2026 onwards.
- If your own forms take card details on pages that load the snippet, treat cards entered on 16 November as possibly exposed. Contact your payment provider. Cards entered in a payment provider's cross-origin iframe could not be read by the skimmer.
- Treat session tokens or other secrets stored in cookies without the HttpOnly flag as exposed, and rotate them.
- Consider telling your customers that your site served them the code. Report URI kept copies of every infected snippet, with hashes and timestamps. It can share them with affected organisations and CERTs on request.
- For the longer term, keep third-party tags off checkout pages. Take card details only through the payment provider's own fields in a cross-origin iframe. Deploy a Content Security Policy with a strict script-src and connect-src. Allowing cdn.optimizely.com does not help here, because the code came from that host. strict-dynamic or unsafe-eval let the payload run on some sites. Cynet advises against blocking cdn.optimizely.com itself.
How to check whether you were hit
The payload changed several times during the day, so one file hash will not catch every version. The researchers published these indicators:
- Domain
1688360[.]cc(payload host), paths/track.js,/card.phpand/hit.php - IP
136.113.106[.]136(address of1688360[.]cc) - Domains
5vobauua3ojpklx[.]icuandeil786npto9u5bq[.]icu(iOS stage) - Domain
webshell[.]lol(injector) - SHA-256
f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40(final version of track.js) - SHA-256
617df364120adc47fb4f55dcc0c69a9b6c9e108a92c60bc2b64a266254ab02f3(earliest captured version of track.js)
Your site was probably affected in either of these cases:
- Your Optimizely projects or downloaded snippets contain these strings.
- Your CSP reports or logs show browsers connecting to these hosts from your pages on 16 November.
Report URI's analysis lists all 178 organisations it found, with their domains. Checking that list alone is not enough, because the researchers could only check the snippets they found in time.
Update November 19, 2026
Optimizely's status page now says how the attacker got in. An unauthorised third party exploited a flaw in the account signup flow of Optimizely Web Experimentation on 16 November 2026. According to Optimizely, as reported by CMSWire, the attacker used the flaw to act as users on targeted customer accounts and add malicious JavaScript to those customers' projects. Optimizely says the flaw is fixed on its side, and customers have no software to install. Write access came through the vendor's signup flaw, so still check each project's Project JavaScript and experiment code as described above. Review the user list of each account for members you did not add, and check change histories, if your plan has them, for edits you did not make on 16 November.
- https://status.optimizely.com/
- https://www.cmswire.com/digital-experience/optimizely-works-through-web-experimentation-security-incident/
Sources
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